Clayton Featherstone

Clayton Featherstone
  • Lecturer, Business Economics and Public Policy

Contact Information

  • office Address:

    319 Vance Hall
    3733 Spruce St.
    Philadelphia, PA 19104

Research Interests: experiments, market design, matching, applied theory

Links: Personal Website


Clayton Featherstone earned his Ph.D. from the Department of Economics at Stanford.  He then was Post-Doctoral Fellow of Business Administration at Harvard Business School before joining the faculty at Wharton.

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  • Colin Sullivan, Clayton Featherstone, Eric Mayefsky, Why Do Some Clearinghouses Yield Stable Outcomes? Experimental Evidence on Out-of-Equilibrium Truth-Telling.

    Abstract: In two-sided settings, market designers tend to advocate for deferred acceptance (DA) over priority mechanisms, even though theory tells us that both types of mechanisms can yield unstable matches in incomplete information equilibrium. However, if match participants on the proposed-to side deviate from equilibrium by truth-telling, then DA yields stable outcomes. In a novel experimental setting, we find out-of-equilibrium truth-telling under DA but not under a priority mechanism, which could help to explain the success of DA in preventing unraveling in the field. We then attempt to explain the difference in behavior across mechanisms by estimating an experience-weighted learning model adapted to this complex strategic environment.  We find that initial beliefs drive the difference in agents' ability to find strategic equilibria, rather than alternative explanations such as differences in the learning process.


Past Courses


    This course establishes the micro-economic foundations for understanding business decision-making. The course will cover consumer theory and market demand under full information, market equilibrium and government intervention, production theory and cost optimization, producing in perfectly competitive and monopoly markets, vertical relations, and game theory, including simultaneous, sequential, and infinitely repeated games. Finally, we will wrap up game theory with an application to auctions. Students are expected to have mastered these materials before enrolling in the second quarter course: Microeconomics for Managers: Advanced Applications.


    This course will cover the economic foundations of business strategy and decision-making in market environments with other strategic actors and less than full information, as well as advanced pricing strategies. Topics include oligopoly models of market competition, creation, and protection, sophisticated pricing strategies for consumers with different valuations or consumers who buy multiple units (e.g. price discrimination, bundling, two-part tariffs), strategies for managing risk and making decisions under uncertainty, asymmetric information and its consequences for markets, and finally moral hazard and principle-agent theory with application to incentive contacts.

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Latest Research

Colin Sullivan, Clayton Featherstone, Eric Mayefsky, Why Do Some Clearinghouses Yield Stable Outcomes? Experimental Evidence on Out-of-Equilibrium Truth-Telling.
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In the News

How a Simple Nudge Spurred More People to Say ‘Yes’ to Teach for America

Recent Wharton research examines how "social information" can affect the outcome of high-stakes decisions, such as choosing that first job.Read More

Knowledge at Wharton - 5/5/2017
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