

LAURENCE ANTHONY GO

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WHARTON SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Placement Director: Gilles Duranton

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Doctoral Studies:

Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2014 to present

Thesis Title: "Essays in Development Economics"

Expected Completion Date: June 2020

Thesis Committee and References:

Professor Santosh Anagol

Co-Chair / Primary Advisor

Business Economics and Public Policy

Wharton School

anagol@wharton.upenn.edu

Professor Shing-Yi Wang

Co-Chair / Primary Advisor

Business Economics and Public Policy

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was@wharton.upenn.edu

Professor Maisy Wong

Advisor

Real Estate

Wharton School

maisy@wharton.upenn.edu

Pre-Doctoral Studies:

M.S., Applied Economics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2016

M.Sc., Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, London School of Economics, 2014

B.S., Business Economics, University of the Philippines, 2011

Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary fields: Development Economics, Political Economy

Secondary fields: Labor Economics, Organizational Economics

Teaching Experience:

Fall, 2016

Managerial Economics (BEPP 250/950), Wharton School, TA for Professor Gilles Duranton

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2015 - 2018

Research Assistant for Professor Shing-Yi Wang

2016

Short-term Consultant, World Bank, Washington D.C.

2015

Research Assistant for Professor Maisy Wong

Conferences and Presentations:

May 2017 Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference, London Business School, London, UK
Dec 2016 Wharton-INSEAD Doctoral Consortium, INSEAD, Singapore, SG

Grants and Fellowships:

2018 Institute for Humane Studies Humane Studies Fellowship
2018 Institute for Humane Studies Hayek Fund Scholarship
2017 Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Grant
2017 Institute for Humane Studies PhD Scholarship
2017 Wharton Doctoral Travel Grant
2016 GAPSA Travel Grant
2015, 2017-18 Mack Institute for Innovation Management Research Fellowship
2015 Wharton Social Impact Initiative Research Grant
2014 – 2019 Wharton Doctoral Education Fellowship

Academic Service:

Refereed for: *Journal of Public Economics*

Research Papers:

“Family Comes First: Political Dynasties, Rank Effect and Political Succession”, with Dean Dulay
(Job Market Paper)

What explains the persistence of political dynasties over time? We argue that dynasties remain in power through strategic succession of family members. We test this empirically by exploiting a setting where rank effects are observed, i.e. where candidates who barely rank higher in elections are significantly more likely to run for higher office. Using a regression discontinuity design on close elections in the Philippines, we establish the first place effect: first placers are 5-9% more likely to seek election to higher office than comparable second placers. We then document a novel phenomenon called the family first effect: first place effects are overturned when family linkages between politicians exist. Succession norms, where dynasties assign their family members to different positions of power, across different periods in time, are consistent with these results. Party alignment, voter coordination and information transmission are unlikely to explain our findings.

“When Running for Office Runs in the Family: Political Dynasties, Preferences and Local Government Spending in the Philippines”, with Dean Dulay

Political dynasties exist in practically every variant of democracy. Yet, the literature has not theorized about how particular forms and functions of political dynasties benefit their members. We argue that horizontal dynasties—multiple members from a family holding political office concurrently—leads to higher levels of local government spending. Horizontal dynasties increase local government spending by replacing potential political opponents who may oppose spending with members of the family. Members from the same family have aligned preferences, and these preferences reduce conflict and increase coordination across offices, allowing politicians to pursue their political goals. We test this argument's implications in the Philippine context. Employing a regression discontinuity design on a sample of mayors, we show that (i) horizontally dynastic mayors have higher levels of local government spending and (ii) increasing local government spending is driven by preference alignment, which leads to less conflict and greater coordination between politicians.

Research Papers in Progress:

Migration and Voting Networks: Evidence from Filipino Migrants in the UAE, with Shing-Yi Wang
Minimum Wage Determination: Evidence from Regional Wage Boards in the Philippines
Economic Nationalism, Firm Growth and Industrial Development: Evidence from Naturalization Laws

Software: Stata, R, Matlab, LaTeX, ArcGIS

Personal Information: February 1, 1989; Male; Filipino