

# Colin D. Sullivan

Landau Economics Building 337  
579 Jane Stanford Way • Stanford, CA 93405  
312-316-3086 • cdsulliv@stanford.edu

Placement Director: Gilles Duranton      duranton@wharton.upenn.edu    215-898-2859  
Graduate Administrator: Diana Broach      dhs@wharton.upenn.edu    215-898-7761

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## Education

**The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania**      **Philadelphia, PA**  
*PhD, Applied Economics*      *May 2019*

### Thesis Committee and References

Judd B. Kessler (Chair)  
judd.kessler@wharton.upenn.edu  
215-898-6372

Corinne Low  
corlow@wharton.upenn.edu  
215-898-0928

Clayton R. Featherstone  
claytonf@wharton.upenn.edu  
215-898-4749

**Harvard University**      **Cambridge, MA**  
*AM, Statistics*      *May 2014*

**University of Chicago**      **Chicago, IL**  
*AB, Economics & Political Science*      *June 2009*

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## Research Interests

Matching markets and market design; organ transplantation; labor economics; experiments

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## Academic Employment

**Stanford University Department of Economics**      **Stanford, CA**  
*Postdoctoral Fellow*      *August 2019 – August 2021*

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## Publications & Working Papers

### **Eliciting Preferences over Life and Death: Experimental Evidence from Organ Transplantation (Job Market Paper)**

*Abstract:* Optimal allocation of scarce, life-saving medical treatment depends on society's preferences over survival distributions, governed by notions of equality and efficiency. In a novel experiment, I elicit preferences over survival distributions in incentivized, life-or-death decisions. Subjects allocate an organ transplant among real cats with kidney failure. In each choice, subjects allocate a single organ based on the expected survival of each patient. The survival rates imply a price ratio, allowing me to infer the shape of indifference curves over survival bundles. I find that the vast majority (80%) of subjects respond to increases in total expected survival time, while a small minority display Leontief preferences, providing the transplant to the shortest-lived patient at all price ratios. Hypothetical decisions may not be reliable in this context: a large share (46%) of subjects allocate a hypothetical transplant differently than a real transplant, though estimates of aggregate preferences are the same across incentivized and unincentivized conditions. Finally, I show that aversion to wealth inequality is a good predictor of aversion to survival inequality.

Kessler, Judd B., Corinne Low, and Colin D. Sullivan. 2019. "Incentivized Resume Rating: Eliciting Employer Preferences without Deception." *American Economic Review*, 109 (11): 3713-44.

*Abstract:* We introduce a new experimental paradigm to evaluate employer preferences, called Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Employers evaluate resumes they know to be hypothetical in order to be matched with real job seekers, preserving incentives while avoiding the deception necessary in audit studies. We deploy IRR with employers recruiting college seniors from a prestigious school, randomizing human capital characteristics and demographics of hypothetical candidates. We measure both employer preferences for candidates and employer beliefs about the likelihood candidates will accept job offers, avoiding a typical confound in audit studies. We discuss the costs, benefits, and future applications of this new methodology.

**Learning to Manipulate: Experimental Evidence on Out-of-Equilibrium Truth-Telling (with Clayton R. Featherstone and Eric Mayefsky)**

*Abstract:* When matching mechanisms yield unstable assignments, unraveling can lead participants to abandon them. This is thought to explain why, empirically, the stable Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism persists where unstable alternatives, such as priority mechanisms, do not. Theory, however, tells us that both DA and priority mechanisms can yield unstable matches in incomplete information equilibrium. Nonetheless, if match participants on the proposed-to side deviate from equilibrium by truth-telling, then DA yields stable outcomes. In an experiment, we find such behavior under DA (but not under a priority mechanism). This suggests that out-of-equilibrium truth-telling might help to explain the success of DA. We model the learning process under both mechanisms, and find that initial beliefs about gameplay drive differences in learning. These findings suggest the benefits of a persistent clearinghouse under DA could be undone by informing players of the game's strategic elements.

**Other-Regarding Preferences and Paternalistic Discrimination in Hiring (with Nina Buchmann and Suhani Jalota)**

*Abstract:* Do norms aimed at protecting women actually increase gender discrimination in hiring? We develop a model that generates testable predictions to detect other-regarding preferences in hiring. We define paternalistic discrimination as a form of other-regarding preference in which employers hire men to protect female candidates from jobs perceived as harmful or difficult. We then document other-regarding preferences and paternalistic discrimination in a series of hiring experiments where jobs are designed to vary systematically in their perceived harm to women. Finally, we estimate the share of gender discrimination resulting from other-regarding preferences, and use survey data to benchmark the magnitude of paternalistic discrimination in a variety of industries.

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## Teaching

<b>Instructor: Economic Principles for Social Policy (MSSP 668 Module I)</b> <i>University of Pennsylvania School of Social Policy and Practice</i>	<b>Philadelphia, PA</b> <i>Fall 2016</i>
<b>TA: Behavioral Economics, Markets, and Public Policy (BEPP 220 and BEPP 620)</b> <i>The Wharton School</i>	<b>Philadelphia, PA</b> <i>Spring 2019</i>
<b>TA: Managerial Economics (BEPP 250)</b> <i>The Wharton School</i>	<b>Philadelphia, PA</b> <i>Fall 2017</i>
<b>TA: Wharton Industry Exploration — Public Policy Sector (WH-297)</b> <i>The Wharton School</i>	<b>Philadelphia, PA &amp; Washington, DC</b> <i>Spring 2016 &amp; Spring 2017</i>

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## Professional Activities

### *Conference Presentations*

<b>SITE Experimental Economics</b> <i>Palo Alto, CA</i>	<b>August 2017</b>
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**Advances with Field Experiments**

*Chicago, IL*

**September 2017**

**Wharton, Columbia & NYU Experimental Economics Student Conference**

*New York, NY*

**October 2016, 2017, & 2018**

*Institutional Service*

**Penn Graduate and Professional Students Assembly**

*Wharton Doctoral Representative*

**2016 – 2017**

**Introduction to Diversity in Doctoral Education and Scholarship**

*Doctoral Student Panel*

**April 2017 & April 2018**

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**Grants & Fellowships**

**Russell Ackoff Doctoral Student Fellowship**

Spring 2018

**Wharton Business Economics and Public Policy Travel Grant**

Fall 2017

**GAPSA Research Travel Grant**

Summer 2017

**George James Term Fund Travel Award**

Summer 2017

**Wharton Graduate Research Fellowship**

2015 – 2019

**Wharton Graduate Educational Fellowship**

2014 – 2015

**National Security Education Program Boren Scholarship, Damascus (Syria)**

June – December 2007

**University of Chicago Foreign Language Acquisition Grant, Damascus (Syria)**

Summer 2007

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**Other Experience**

**Center for Education Policy Research, Harvard University**

*Research Analyst*

**Cambridge, MA**

*September 2012 – June 2014*

**Central Intelligence Agency**

*Economic Analyst — Middle East and North Africa*

**McLean, VA**

*July 2011 – August 2012*

**Harvard Kennedy School**

*Research Assistant to Professors John Friedman and Joshua Goodman*

**Cambridge, MA**

*July 2010 – July 2011*

**Institute for Defense Analyses — Cost Analysis and Research Division**

*Research Assistant*

**Alexandria, VA**

*June 2009 – June 2010*