Corinne Low

Ashley Litwin and Corinne Low (Forthcoming), Measuring Discrimination with Experiments.

Abstract: Discrimination based on group membership has been documented in numerous settings and on the basis of a diverse set of characteristics. This article reviews the key experimental methods used by economists to measure discrimination, provide insights on its sources, and mitigate its effects. We first summarize common lab experimental methods for detecting discrimination, including economic games and stylized hiring experiments. We then discuss field experimental methods, including audit studies, correspondence studies, and Incentivized Resume Rating (IRR). Throughout, we emphasize the strengths and weaknesses of both lab and field experiments and provide practical guidance for avoiding common design pitfalls. We conclude with suggestions for future research.

Kyle Hancock, Jeanne Lafortune, Corinne Low (Working), Winning the Bread and Baking it Too: Gendered Frictions in the Allocation of Home Production.

Abstract: We document that female breadwinners do more home production than their male partners, driven by “housework” like cooking and cleaning. By comparing to same sex couples, we highlight that specialization within heterosexual households does not appear to be “gender neutral” even after accounting for average earnings differences. One possible explanation would be a large comparative advantage in housework by women, a supposition commonly used to match aggregate labor supply statistics. Using a model, we show that while comparative advantage can match some stylized facts about how couples divide housework, it fails to match others, particularly that men’s housework time is inelastic to relative household wages. Matching these facts requires some gendered wedge between the opportunity cost of housework time and its assignment within the household. We then turn to the implications for household formation. Gendered rigidities in the allocation of household tasks result in lower surplus for couples where women out-earn men than vice versa, providing a micro-founded reason for substantial literature showing that lower relative earning by men decreases marriage rates. We show that our mechanism—allocation of housework, rather than norms about earnings—plays a role by relating marriage rates to the ratio of home production time in US immigrants’ countries of origin.

Pierre-Andre Chiappori and Corinne Low, “Frictionless One-to-One Matching with Transfers: Theory”. In Handbook of the Economics of Matching, edited by Yeon-Koo Che, Pierre-André Chiappori, and Bernard Salanié, (North Holland, 2024), pp. 1-39

Abstract: This chapter provides an overview of transferable utility one-to-one matching theory. We begin with a simple, unidimensional example of a supplier and manufacturer to motivate the problem. The example is generalized into a unidimensional mathematical framework that incorporates a continuum of agents. We demonstrate that this problem can be solved as a surplus maximization problem--that with perfectly transferable utility, who will be matched with whom in equilibrium is equivalent to who should be matched with whom to maximize total surplus. We demonstrate how to recover the division of surplus within matched pairs, and review applications of the unidimensional model. We then consider the multidimensional case, introduce index models, and describe applications, including the possibility of randomization and non-monotonic matching along a single dimension. We conclude with a discussion of adapting transferable utility models to the researcher's setting of interest.

Christine Exley, Raymond Fisman, Judd B. Kessler, Louis-Pierre Lepage, Xiaomeng Li, Corinne Low, Xiaoyue Shan, Mattie Toma, Basit Zafar (Working), Information-Optional Policies and the Gender Concealment Gap.

Abstract: We analyze data from two universities that allowed students to replace a letter grade with “credit” on their transcript. At both schools, we observe a significant and substantial gender concealment gap: women are less likely than men to conceal grades, particularly grades that would harm their GPA. This gender concealment gap produces differential GPA gains from the policy with men benefiting nearly 50% more than women. Additional complementary data, including surveys and experiments with students and employers, suggest why women may conceal less: women may expect observers to have more negative inferences about their concealed grades.

Natalie Bau, David Henning, Corinne Low, Bryce Steinberg (Working), Family Planning, Now and Later: Infertility Fears and Contraceptive Take-Up.

Abstract: Early fertility is a key barrier to female human capital attainment in sub-Saharan Africa, yet contraceptive take-up remains puzzlingly low, even among educated populations with healthcare access. We study a barrier to hormonal contraceptive uptake that has not been causally tested: the persistent (incorrect) belief that these contraceptives cause later infertility. This belief creates a perceived tradeoff between current and future reproductive control. We use a randomized controlled trial with female undergraduates at the flagship university in Zambia to test two interventions to increase contraceptive use. Despite high rates of sexual activity, low rates of condom-use, and near zero desire for current pregnancy, only 5% of this population uses hormonal contraceptives at baseline. Providing a non-coercive conditional cash transfer to visit a local clinic only temporarily increases contraceptive use. However, pairing this transfer with information addressing fears that contraceptives cause infertility has a larger initial effect and persistently increases take-up over 6 months. This treatment reduces beliefs that contraceptives cause infertility and leads to the take-up of longer-lasting contraceptives. Compliers are more likely to cite fear of infertility as the reason for not using contraceptives at baseline. Eliminating the belief that contraceptives cause infertility would more than triple contraceptive use.

Corinne Low (2024), Pricing the Biological Clock: The Marriage Market Costs of Aging to Women, Journal of Labor Economics, 42 (2), pp. 395-426.

Abstract: This paper quantifies the causal negative impact of age on women’s marriage market appeal using an experiment where real online daters rate hypothetical profiles with randomly assigned ages. Truthfulness is incentivized through the experiment’s compensation: participants receive professional dating advice customized according to their ratings. The experiment shows that for every year a woman ages, she must earn $7,000 more annually to remain equally attractive to potential partners. This preference appears driven by women’s asymmetric fertility decline with age, as it is present only for men without children and who have accurate knowledge of the age-fertility trade-off.

Judd B. Kessler, Corinne Low, Xiaoyue Shan (2024), Lowering the Playing Field: Discrimination through Sequential Spillover Effects, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 00 (), pp. 1-28.

Abstract: We document a new way that discrimination operates: through sequential spillover effects. Employers in an incentivized resume rating experiment evaluate a sequence of hypothetical candidates with randomly assigned characteristics. Candidates are rated worse when following white men than when following women or minorities. Exploring the mechanisms, we find that spillover effects are inversely related to direct bias. When reviewing high-quality resumes or recruiting in STEM industries, employers directly favor white men and display no spillover effect. For low-quality resumes or non-STEM industries, we find no direct bias but a strong spillover effect. Results suggest that discrimination arises in subtle ways.

Jeanne Lafortune and Corinne Low (2023), Collateralized Marriage, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 15 (4), pp. 252-291.

Abstract: Marriage rates have become increasingly stratified by homeownership. We investigate this in a household model where investments in public goods reduce future earnings and, thus, divorce risk creates inefficiencies. Access to a joint savings technology, like a house, collateralizes marriage, providing insurance to the lower-earning partner and increasing specialization, public goods, and value from marriage. We use idiosyncratic variation in housing prices to show that homeownership access indeed leads to greater specialization. The model also predicts that policies that erode the marriage contract in other ways will make wealth a more important determinant of marriage, which we confirm empirically.

Ioana Botea, Andrew Brudevold-Newman, Markus Goldstein, Corinne Low, Gareth Roberts (Working), Supporting Women’s Livelihoods at Scale: Evidence from a Nationwide Multi-Faceted Program.

Abstract: The success of multi-faceted “graduation” programs at reducing poverty raises three questions: can the impacts of these programs be maintained when implemented by governments at scale, will positive effects be offset by negative spillovers, and can bundled programs be streamlined without losing im- pact? We find that a nationwide livelihood program implemented by the government of Zambia yielded consumption and earnings increases comparable to graduation programs, without negative economic spillovers on non-beneficiaries. However, the effects were entirely driven by the asset transfer portion of the bundled intervention, indicating a streamlined package could be a promising poverty alleviation strategy for developing-country governments.

Natalie Bau, Gaurav Khanna, Corinne Low, Alessandra Voena (Under Revision), Traditional Institutions in Modern Times: Dowries as Pensions When Sons Migrate.

Abstract: This paper examines whether an important cultural institution in India - dowry - can enable male migration by increasing the liquidity available to young men after marriage. We hypothesize that one cost of migration is the disruption of traditional elderly support structures, where sons live near their parents and care for them in their old age. Dowry can attenuate this cost by providing sons and parents with a liquid transfer that eases constraints on income sharing. To test this hypothesis, we collect two novel datasets on property rights over dowry among migrants and among families of migrants. Net transfers of dowry to a man's parents are common but far from universal. Consistent with using dowry for income sharing, transfers occur more when sons migrate, especially when they work in higher-earning occupations. Nationally representative data confirms that migration rates are higher in areas with stronger historical dowry traditions. Finally, exploiting a large-scale highway construction program, we show that men from areas with stronger dowry traditions have a higher migration response to reduced migration costs. Despite its potentially adverse consequences, dowry may play a role in facilitating migration and therefore, economic development.