Research Interests: Environmental economics, industrial organization, spatial
Links: CV, Personal Website
Education
BS in Economics and BSE in Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, 2019
Work Experience
Research Intern, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2018-2019
I am on the job market this Fall 2024-2025. Please find my job market paper abstract and website here.
This paper first quantifies a global measure of inefficient and spatially misallocated agricultural deforestation: carbon emissions-intensive deforestation on land with low agricultural yields. I use granular spatial data and a trade general equilibrium model to identify a joint global supply curve of agricultural production and deforestation-based carbon emissions. Under a Pigouvian tax with a $190 per ton social cost of carbon, 97% of carbon emissions from deforestation since 1982 are inefficient. Strikingly, these emissions are produced by only 10% of the most carbon emissions intensive global agricultural land, consequently costing only 6% of status quo agricultural production. Next, if current carbon taxes across other sectors are applied to deforestation, they would deliver 15% of Pigouvian emissions reductions. However, coordination and trade in deforestation reductions, such as through payments for ecosystem services, reduces the cost of the equivalent emissions reduction by 57%. In contrast, land protection policies abate less, cost more, and are more prone to leakage.
The European Union designates 26% of its landmass as a protected area, limiting economic development to favor biodiversity. This paper uses the staggered introduction of protected-area policies between 1985 and 2020 to study the selection of land for protection and the causal effect of protection on vegetation cover and nightlights. Our results reveal protection did not affect the outcomes in any meaningful way across four decades, all countries, protection cohorts, and a wide range of land and climate attributes. We conclude that European conservation efforts lack ambition because policymakers select land for protection not threatened by development.
Prakash Mishra (Draft), The Global Allocative Efficiency of Deforestation.
Abstract: This paper quantifies global inefficient and spatially misallocated agricultural deforestation: carbon emissions-intensive deforestation on land with low agricultural yields. I overcome the limitations of a reduced form descriptive analysis by incorporating spatial cost differences, agricultural trade, and cross-country non-agricultural productivity in a trade general equilibrium model to estimate how they contribute to misallocation. Against a benchmark case with a Pigouvian tax at a $190 per ton social cost of carbon, 97% of carbon emissions from deforestation since 1982 are inefficient. Strikingly, these emissions are produced by only 13% of global agricultural land. Preventing these emissions costs only 7% of status quo agricultural production, yielding welfare gains of $6.6 trillion since 1982. However, an equity-efficiency tradeoff results: the tax burden falls on the poorest landowners. Lastly, if countries with carbon pricing policy apply these prices to deforestation, they would deliver 5% of emissions reductions achieved under the Pigouvian benchmark.
Prakash Mishra (Under Review), An evaluation of protected area policies in the European Union.
Abstract: The European Union designates 26% of its landmass as a protected area, limiting economic development to favor biodiversity. This paper uses the staggered introduction of protected-area policies between 1985 and 2020 to study the selection of land for protection and the causal effect of protection on vegetation cover and nightlights. Our results reveal protection did not affect the outcomes in any meaningful way across four decades, all countries, protection cohorts, and a wide range of land and climate attributes. We conclude that European conservation efforts lack ambition because policymakers select land for protection not threatened by development.
This course will introduce you to “managerial economics” which is the application of microeconomic theory to managerial decision-making. Microeconomic theory is a remarkably useful body of ideas for understanding and analyzing the behavior of individuals and firms in a variety of economic settings. The goal of the course is for you to understand this body of theory well enough so that you can effectively analyze managerial (and other) problems in an economic framework. While this is a “tools” course, we will cover many real-world applications, particularly business applications, so that you can witness the usefulness of these tools and acquire the skills to use them yourself. We will depart from the usual microeconomic theory course by giving more emphasis to prescription: What should a manager do in order to achieve some objective? That course deliverable is to compare with description: Why do firms and consumers act the way they do? The latter will still be quite prominent in this course because only by understanding how other firms and customers behave can a manager determine what is beswt for him or her to do. Strategic interaction is explored both in product markets and auctions. Finally, the challenges created by asymmetric information – both in the market and within the firm – are investigated.
This course examines environmental and energy issues from an economist’s perspective. Over the last several decades, energy markets have become some of the most dynamic markets of the world economy, as they experienced a shift from heavy regulation to market-driven incentives. First, we look at scarcity pricing and market power in electricity and gasoline markets. We then study oil and gas markets, with an emphasis on optimal extraction and pricing and geopolitical risks that investors in hydrocarbon resources face. We then shift gears to the sources of environmental problems, and how policy makers can intervene to solve some of these problems. We talk about the economic rationale for a broad range of possible policies: environmental taxes, subsidies, performance standards and cap-and-trade. In doing so, we discuss fundamental concepts in environmental economics, such as externalities, valuation of the environment and the challenge of designing international agreements. There is special emphasis on the economics and finance of renewable energy, including an introduction to energy storage. Other topics include energy efficiency and transportation policies such as fuel-economy and electric vehicle standards.
Wharton Climate Center Research Grant, 2024.
Wharton Global Initiative Research Grant, 2024.
Winkelman Fellowship, 2021.
Russel Ackoff Doctoral Grants, 2021 and 2022.