Shing-Yi Wang, Jing Cai, Sai Luo (Working), Money or Monitoring: Evidence on Improving Worker Effort.
Abstract: Higher compensation and increased monitoring are two common strategies for addressing the moral hazard problem between firms and workers. In a field experiment with new hires at an automobile manufacturing firm in China, we randomly varied both signing bonuses and monitoring intensity. Both interventions increased worker output but through different channels: signing bonuses led to longer working hours without significant gains in performance, while enhanced monitoring improved performance as evaluated by managers. Additionally, bonuses reduced quit rates, whereas monitoring raised them. These results suggest that firms should carefully consider their primary objectives and weigh these tradeoffs when designing optimal labor contracts.
Shing-Yi Wang (2023), The Labor Supply Consequences of Having a Boy in China, World Bank Economic Review.
Suresh Naidu, Yaw Nyarko, Shing-Yi Wang (Working), The Benefits and Costs of Guest Worker Programs: Experimental Evidence from the India-UAE Migration Corridor.
Jing Cai and Shing-Yi Wang (2022), Improving Management through Worker Evaluations: Evidence from Auto Manufacturing, Quarterly Journal of Economics.
A.V. Chari, Elaine M. Liu, Shing-Yi Wang, Yongxiang Wang (2021), Property Rights, Land Misallocation and Agricultural Efficiency in China, Review of Economic Studies.
Erica M. Field, Leigh L. Linden, Ofer Malamud, Daniel Rubenson, Shing-Yi Wang, Does Vocational Education Work? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mongolia.
Yaw Nyarko, Thomas Joseph, Shing-Yi Wang (2018), Asymmetric Information and Remittances: Evidence from Matched Administrative Data, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics.
Rema Hanna and Shing-Yi Wang (2017), Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9 (3), pp. 262-290.
Suresh Naidu, Yaw Nyarko, Shing-Yi Wang (2016), Monopsony Power in Migrant Labor Markets: Evidence from the United Arab Emirates, Journal of Political Economy.
Cynthia Kinnan, Shing-Yi Wang, Yongxiang Wang (2015), Access to Migration for Rural Households, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, forthcoming ().
Abstract: There are an estimated 750 million internal migrants in the world, yet the effects of access to internal migration for rural households are not well understood. Internal migrants may provide wealth transfers, insurance or credit to households remaining in rural areas. This paper exploits two unique features of China’s history to study the impact of relaxing migration constraints on the outcomes and choices of agricultural households: reforms to the household registration (hukou) system that relaxed restrictions on migration, and historical, centrally-planned migration flows. We show that historical flows of temporary migration due to a government policy called the “sentdown youth” (SDY) program created lasting inter-province links, so that decades later, reforms to the hukou system in cities which sent SDY increased migration in provinces where those SDY were sent. Using this variation, we find that improved access to migration leads to higher levels of consumption and lower consumption volatility for rural households. Furthermore, household production decisions change, with a shift into high-risk, high-return activities including animal husbandry and fruit farming.
